| Home » Meet the Press | sponsored by |
 |
'Meet the Press' transcript for March 30, 2008
Broadcast videos, highlights |
 Netcast March 30: General Michael Hayden will join us in his first Sunday morning interview as CIA Director to talk about Iraq, Iran, U.S. Intelligence & the war against terror. Then, a political roundtable on Decision 2008 with Peter Beinart and David Brooks. |
 | Slide show |
 | 60 years of ‘Meet the Press’ A photographic look back at the longest-running program in television history and the guests who graced the broadcast – from Martin Luther King Jr. to Jimmy Hoffa. more photos |
MR. RUSSERT: Was the surge a natural break?
GEN. HAYDEN: The surge created an opportunity. The surge, in its own way, was an artificial imposition of a break. It changed the equation. That's exactly what it did. And it allowed some space for the Iraqis to step up, and they've begun to do that.
MR. RUSSERT: Could Prime Minister Maliki have been successful in Basra if, in fact, he is without considerable U.S. air power and, and operational support on the ground?
GEN. HAYDEN: Well, we'll see. Only, only now do we begin to see perhaps an increased reliance on, on coalition fire power. You know, we've, we've made the point when people talk about the American troop presence in Iraq that it's not so much coalition power, coalition combat power that's the measure. What you need is combat power that is competent and evenhanded. And that, over time, we would expect more and more of that definition to be met by Iraqi security forces. Now you see Maliki trying to do this now, and, and, frankly, he may not have enough Iraqi competent and evenhanded combat power to pull this off. Hence, the need for some coalition support.
MR. RUSSERT: In fact, you said that two weeks ago that an abrupt pullout of U.S. troops from Iraq would remove needed competent and evenhanded combat power from the country. "We are not at the point where the Iraqis can provide all of that. And I don't think we'll be at that point for some time.'"
GEN. HAYDEN: That's correct.
MR. RUSSERT: What is "for some time"?
GEN. HAYDEN: I--the better experts on this are going to be coming into town next week. Dave Petraeus, the commander of multinational forces in Iraq, and Ambassador Crocker. I think they'll be able to, to give a better description of it. But what I was trying to express when I said that, you know, this is not something that's going to happen next week or next month. This is going to be a gradual slope as Iraqis, again, build this competence in terms of their combat power and apply it in a more evenhanded way.
MR. RUSSERT: It's going to take years.
GEN. HAYDEN: I think so.
MR. RUSSERT: The report from Iraq was supposed to be given to Congress, I believe on today. It's being delayed somewhat. Is that because of the situation in Basra?
GEN. HAYDEN: I'm sorry, what report?
MR. RUSSERT: From Iraq from General Petraeus.
GEN. HAYDEN: I, I, I'm just not aware of the precise timeline.
MR. RUSSERT: Do you think this military activity in Basra is a setback for political reconciliation in Iraq?
GEN. HAYDEN: You, you know, Tim, this was something that we all knew we had to go through. This was inevitable. This had to be resolved. You just can't have the second major city in the country--economically, the most important city in the country--beyond the control of the government. And so, although, you know, there, there's a certain sense of--what's the right word, Tim?--disappointment in, in that--the fact that violence is increasing, we knew we couldn't get to where we had to be for the Iraqi state, for a modern democratic Iraqi state, without going through this.
Click for related content |
MR. RUSSERT: You were not at the CIA on September 11th, 2001 and the successive months after that. You were at the National Security Agency. But looking back at what the American people were told about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, was there a colossal intelligence failure?
GEN. HAYDEN: Yeah, we got it wrong. All right? And although I wasn't at the CIA, I was in the room when that National Intelligence Estimate was approved by the community--it wasn't just a CIA document--and frankly, Tim, I voted yes. It was my belief that what we were saying in that document was correct.
MR. RUSSERT: Why did you get it wrong?
GEN. HAYDEN: Lots of reasons. This, this has certainly been gone over by whole generation of American intelligence officers. There are a couple of narratives. I can suggest a few to you right now. Number one, maybe momentum in terms of what we knew about Iraq, what we had learned about Iraq. And even though our more recent reporting had been very thin, we still kind of carried the old conclusions forward without, frankly, holding them up enough to the light in order to see whether or not they were still valid. I, I'll tell you this. I've seen since then, I've seen estimates that we've had with high confidence turn to medium confidence. And I'd say to our...(unintelligence), "Why is that now medium confidence? Nothing's changed." And, and the answer is, "Yes, but the information on which it has been based has aged off, and therefore we're reducing our confidence level." So we've gone to school on this.
- Discuss Story On Newsvine
- Rate Story:
View popularLowHigh - Instant Message
MORE FROM MEET THE PRESS |
 Meet the Press Section Front |
| Add Meet the Press headlines to your news reader: |